24 Hours Before the Verdict

By Baton Haxhiu

Judges do not descend from heaven, and states do not enter a day of potential regional consequences expecting to learn everything from television broadcasts. Judicial independence is an obligation about how a decision is made, but it does not exclude institutional communication, security assessments and political preparation. Yet preparation for the consequences is not the same as knowing the verdict in advance.

This is the distinction that should guide the debate. States that keep troops or personnel on the ground have reason to seek risk assessments and necessary measures. Governments can analyze possible reactions, prepare communication and plan the protection of personnel without knowing the content of the decision. It does not automatically follow that the verdict was handed to them.

From the information I have received, the expected direction of the verdict has been communicated in state circles outside the court, while the sentences in years and the outcome for each name remain unclear. I present this as information from my sources, still unsupported by public documentation. It justifies the demand for preparation for a heavy decision, but it does not give me the right to declare which of the four defendants will be freed and which will be convicted.

Tomorrow, September 16, at 10:00, the Specialist Chambers will announce the first-instance verdict against Hashim Thaçi, Kadri Veseli, Rexhep Selimi and Jakup Krasniqi. Then we will have the official decision and its reasoning. Today, the main question is whether Kosovo is preparing for the possible consequences and whether Kosovo’s institutions, the Government in particular, are communicating honestly about the limits of what they know.

The United States, Britain, Germany, France and Italy, together with NATO structures and the states that keep troops in Kosovo, have direct reasons to seek advance assessments of the consequences. Governments in Pristina, Tirana, Skopje and Belgrade also have immediate political interest. But a security assessment, a diplomatic expectation and knowledge of the verdict’s content are three different things. They do not become the same just because they pass through important offices.

If the direction of the decision was communicated to states in advance, this requires an explanation of the source, purpose and limits of that information. If, on the contrary, they are acting on the analyses of their own services and diplomats, then their preparation should not be presented as proof that they have read the verdict. In both cases, the public and Kosovo’s citizens have the right to demand accountability for how Kosovo is being prepared. Operational confidentiality cannot become a justification for the absence of political responsibility.

The issue of EU and EULEX staff also matters here. Information about departures or evacuations requires confirmation. Without it, it would be dishonest to write that an evacuation has begun. But if such measures are being considered, the public should know whether this is routine caution, a concrete threat or an assessment of reactions after the decision. These scenarios mean different things and should not be confused with advance knowledge of the verdict.

A plan for the protection of personnel does not prove that someone has read the verdict. It only shows that the possible consequences are being taken seriously. That is why the question for the government is whether it is preparing with the same seriousness for citizens, the defendants’ families and public communication, or whether it will discover the weight of the event only after hearing it from The Hague.

Vučić’s statements should be read in this framework. The confidence a politician displays about an unannounced decision can create the impression of access to information and steer the debate in advance. From rhetoric we cannot know whether he has reliable information. We can only analyze his interest in turning the trial into a political argument against Kosovo.

If there are convictions, there is a risk they will be used to tarnish the entire liberation war. If there are acquittals, the decision could be attacked as a product of Western protection. Neither possibility proves anything, but both show why Kosovo must prepare for the battle over the political interpretation of the decision.

The attributed stance of Congressman Keith Self, expressed today, also shifts the debate toward possible bias and regional stability, while the uncertainty expressed by the defense shows that closeness to the process does not necessarily produce certainty about the outcome. These stances deserve attention, but neither political statements nor professional anxiety replace evidence and judicial reasoning.

For these reasons, we must prepare for the heaviest scenario, without declaring anyone’s guilt in advance. Institutions must have plans for the political and security response, families must be supported, and the public must not be fed promises of acquittal that no one can guarantee. This is state responsibility, not evidence that the verdict is known.

Kosovo must seek justice for each defendant and respect for every victim. Criticism of the verdict must be based on what the court has proven and on how it reasoned its decision. Dissatisfaction can be strong and public, but violence would only give opponents the argument they are looking for.

The EU came out with a stance on the consequences, even though the first-instance decision still had the right of appeal. This prejudged the decision and created the impression that the outcome had been treated as known before the judicial process ended. But whatever the court decides, Hashim Thaçi remains a historic figure of the liberation war and Kosovo’s state-building. A verdict against an individual cannot erase a people’s history, nor equate individual responsibility with collective guilt.

All versions about two acquitted, four acquitted or four convicted remain unconfirmed until the announcement. The authority to decide belongs to the trial panel, while the responsibility to prepare for the consequences belongs to politics. A government cannot demand trust for what it says it does not know and, at the same time, avoid accountability for what it should have foreseen.