In the EU, but under supervision: The new rules for future members
The European Union intends for countries that join in the future to remain under enhanced rule-of-law supervision for up to 15 years after accession.
This is the essence of the European Commission’s enlargement strategy, which was presented on 6 October.
The aim is for the bloc to no longer have another Viktor Orban, or, as EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos put it earlier, not to accept “Trojan horses” that would be activated after joining the EU.
The former Hungarian prime minister, Orban, who stayed in power for 16 years, often used his veto right to block or complicate EU decision-making in foreign policy – from sanctions against Russia to financial aid for Ukraine.
But the problems began inside Hungary itself, with the rule of law.
After taking power in 2010, he adopted a new constitution, brought the Constitutional Court under control and removed hundreds of judges through forced retirement.
He also took control of most of the media and changed the electoral system – actions that led to the launch of proceedings against Hungary under Article 7 of the EU Treaty and to the freezing of billions of euros from European funds.
The new rules proposed by the European Commission aim to make it possible for a member state that regresses on the rule of law to be punished faster and more easily than was possible in Hungary’s case.
Nevertheless, the main question is whether this can work.
“Preventing rule-of-law regression in member states is extremely difficult, as we have seen not only in Hungary, but also in Poland,” Stephen Blockmans, deputy director of the International Centre for Defence and Security, told Radio Free Europe.
In Poland, the previous Government of the Law and Justice Party took control of the Constitutional Court and the body responsible for appointing judges, and imposed disciplinary measures on judges.
For this reason, the European Commission activated the Article 7 procedure for the first time in 2017, while the EU Court of Justice fined Warsaw one million euros per day in 2021.
In Slovakia, the Government of Robert Fico, since 2023, abolished the Special Prosecution for Corruption, softened penalties for economic crimes and brought the public broadcaster under political control, prompting warnings from Brussels and the European Parliament.
What is Article 7?
Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union, unofficially known as the “nuclear option”, enables the suspension of some rights of a member state that seriously and persistently violates the principles of democracy, the rule of law and human rights, including the right to vote in the EU Council.
The procedure takes place in two phases.
First, the EU Council, by a majority of four fifths, establishes that there is a clear risk of a violation and gives recommendations.
However, to impose sanctions, the European Council must establish unanimously, excluding the vote of the state in question, that a serious and persistent violation has occurred.
It is precisely this unanimity requirement that has made the mechanism almost unenforceable.
The procedure was initiated against Poland in 2017 and against Hungary in 2018, but it never reached the second phase, as it was clear the two countries would protect each other through vetoes.
As a result, no sanction was ever imposed under this procedure.
Therefore, Brussels turned to other mechanisms, mainly the freezing of European funds, and the procedure against Poland was closed only in 2024, after the change of power in Warsaw.
How is Article 7 intended to be bypassed?
The novelty in the Commission’s proposal lies in the voting method, and this is precisely where the difference lies between current member states and future ones.
Instead of unanimity, the rights of a new member state that regresses, including the right to vote, could be suspended by qualified majority.
Blockmans recalls that the unanimity requirement, provided for in Article 7, has protected rule-breaking countries for years.
Slovakia, “in coordination with Orban’s Hungary”, has in the past hindered the taking of such decisions. “This new system aims to unblock this procedural obstacle by introducing qualified majority voting,” Blockmans says.
During the first 15 years after accession, the safeguard clause would make it easier to take measures against a state that regresses, mainly through financial conditionality, namely the suspension of funds from the European Union budget.
“This is the novelty proposed by the Commission,” Blockmans says.
In practice, European funds, which for the Balkan economies constitute a key source of investment, would be transformed into the main instrument for preserving the independence of courts and media even after EU accession.
The same logic is intended to be applied before accession as well.
In the working document accompanying the strategy, the European Commission stresses that the new instrument would condition payments for candidate countries on the fulfilment of obligations set out in their reform plans.
This would enable the EU to react faster if a country “regresses in democratic reforms”.
The safeguard clause would not be activated if the new member state does not regress in the field of the rule of law and democracy during this period.
Commissioner Kos stressed on several occasions that the safeguard mechanisms will have no impact on countries that respect the rules and values of the European Union.
A time-limited mechanism
Blockmans does not believe this is the final solution, as this system also carries risks.
According to him, after the end of the 15-year probation period, “there is still the possibility of regression”.
The experience with Hungary and Poland shows that this time period was not chosen by chance.
Both countries joined the EU in 2004.
Orban won a two-thirds majority in Parliament six years later, while the Law and Justice Party took power in Poland after 11 years of membership.
Both crises would have begun within the probation period.
Nevertheless, Orban’s system continued to function long after it ended, while the EU, even two decades after Hungary’s accession, failed to find an effective response.
The example of Slovakia shows the other side of this time limitation.
Slovakia too has been an EU member since 2004, so the measures taken by Fico, almost two decades after accession, would remain outside the scope of the 15-year clause.
Long-term supervision is not a novelty in itself.
Bulgaria and Romania, after joining in 2007, were subjected to a special Cooperation and Verification Mechanism in the field of justice and the fight against corruption, which ended in 2023.
This supervision lasted 16 years, but it did not provide for sanctions.
The new clause would differ precisely in that it would link supervision to financing and, in the most extreme case, to the right to vote.
Different status for current and future members
There is also another problem, which creates differences between member countries.
The safeguard clause would apply only to new members, while countries that are already part of the EU would continue to be protected by the unanimity requirement provided for in Article 7.
Corina Stratulat, an analyst at the European Policy Centre (EPC) in Brussels, warns that safeguard measures help manage the risks of enlargement, but do not necessarily make the European Union ready for enlargement.
“Procedural safeguard measures do not resolve the broader mismatch. The obligations in question are shared by all member countries. However, the possibility of ensuring their enforcement would differ, depending on when a country joined. In the event of a serious violation by a new member, a mechanism created to overcome political obstacles could be applied. Meanwhile, existing members would continue to be subject to the EU’s ordinary instruments,” Stratulat says.
“This difference matters for the very legitimacy of the enlargement process,” she assesses.
The Western Balkans as the first test
The first country where the new rules will be applied, almost certainly, will be from the Western Balkans.
For the region, where European Commission reports note year after year insufficient progress on the rule of law and pressures on the judiciary and the media, the 15-year clause is both a security mechanism and a mirror of the situation.
In fact, supervision has already begun.
The European Commission’s annual rule-of-law report, which previously included only EU member states, now also covers four Western Balkan countries: Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia.
The 15-year clause would link this supervision to concrete consequences.
Montenegro has progressed the most in the integration process and aims to become the 28th member of the EU in 2028.
Commissioner Kos warned that Montenegro’s accession treaty will be the first to include the new safeguard mechanisms.
If this aim is realised, Montenegro would be subjected to enhanced rule-of-law supervision until 2043.
Such a precedent exists, but in a much softer form.
Croatia joined the EU in 2013 with a special safeguard clause for justice and home affairs, as well as supervision by the European Commission.
However, that clause could only be activated during the first three years after accession.
Safeguard clauses as a tool to convince voters in the EU
Accession treaties must be ratified by the parliaments of all member states, and in France, likely, also through a referendum.
The most important public to which the European Commission’s new strategy is addressed is not the candidate countries, but voters in the states that are already EU members.
According to the latest Eurobarometer, from the spring of 2026, enlargement is supported by 53 percent of EU citizens.
However, in France, 54 percent are against enlargement, while only 35 percent support it.
In another survey on enlargement, conducted in 2025, the largest share of respondents, 44 percent, answered that for enlargement to succeed it is necessary to ensure that new member countries respect the rule of law and fight corruption.
Blockmans sees the safeguard clauses as a way to make it easier for EU member states to accept enlargement.
As he says, with new members, existing countries share “money and power”.
The clauses aim to soften concerns that could turn into votes against, when accession treaties go for ratification in parliaments or in referendums.
“It is useful when safeguard clauses are proposed that make stricter the obligations of acceding countries, as well as the way their enforcement will be ensured,” Blockmans says.
“This helps to convince voters that new members will not hinder the functioning of the European Union, as we have seen happen with Orban’s Hungary,” he concludes. /REL



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