Did Albania win anything from the first arbitration ruling on the Vlora Airport?

By Fatos Çoçoli

On September 16, 2026, Ms. Cecilia Carrara, Emergency Arbitrator of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Court of Arbitration based in London, issued the Emergency Order, following the arbitration proceedings initiated by the concessionaire of the Vlora International Airport, majority-owned by Mr. Behxhet Pacolli’s MABCO company, in its claim against the state of Albania, represented by the Ministry of Infrastructure and Energy.

In the Emergency Order, Arbitrator Carrara rejected the concessionaire’s main request to fully suspend the Albanian government’s termination of the concession contract, finding that the evidence did not offer sufficient legal grounds for a full suspension at this emergency stage.

The arbitrator also rejected the concessionaire’s request to compel the Albanian government to enter mediation proceedings with the concessionaire, to appoint a mediator and to postpone the arbitration proceedings by two months.

Of the concessionaire’s three requests, Arbitrator Carrara accepted and ordered the least significant, but a fair one. She issued a temporary and limited measure, ordering the Ministry of Infrastructure and Energy to temporarily refrain from exercising rights arising from the termination of the concession contract, such as taking operational control of the Airport, demanding the handover of assets, or replacing the concessionaire with another operator.

The latter are actions that would prejudice the arbitration’s decision-making once the arbitral tribunal is formed, which will examine the case on the merits. This protective limitation remains in force only until the arbitral tribunal is formally constituted. The ICC usually takes about a month to form the tribunal.

The refusal to suspend the concession contract: a weighty procedural signal

Although it is not a final decision, the fact that the arbitrator did not consider the legal and evidentiary basis sufficient for a full suspension of the termination is significant.

The concessionaire had sought urgent intervention, which would have changed the situation created after the Albanian government’s decision.

Instead of ordering the immediate return of the status quo (the previous state) requested by the concessionaire, Arbitrator Carrara chose not to grant this measure.

This means that, at this procedural stage, the necessary conviction for such urgent intervention was not created.

The mediation request was also rejected

Another important element of the ICC arbitrator’s Emergency Order is the rejection of the concessionaire’s request that the Albanian government enter mediation proceedings with the concessionaire, appoint a mediator and postpone the arbitration procedure by two months. This decision also carries procedural weight.

The concessionaire sought to create space for a negotiated settlement of the conflict before the arbitration procedure continued. The ICC arbitrator did not accept this request.

What does the Emergency Order mean for the Albanian government?

For the Albanian state, the most immediate consequence is that no urgent measure was imposed that would fully suspend the effect of the termination of the concession contract. This is a significant development for the situation of the Vlora International Airport. By the very nature of the Order, there is significant room for the Albanian state to consider concrete solutions for the completion of the Airport, if done in accordance with the contract, the arbitration’s decisions, Albanian legislation and public procurement rules.

This is primary for the government and for us as citizens, since both sides want the Vlora Airport to become operational as soon as possible. Of course, as citizens we also want the compensation claimed by the concessionaire, if the ICC arbitration decides in its favor — rumored in the media to be €400 million — not to burden our tax budget.

But most importantly, the Vlora International Airport must be completed and become operational as soon as possible!

It is not only the people of Vlora who await it impatiently. The Vlora Airport is awaited by the tourism of all of Albania, transport, employment, investments and the economic development of the south of the country.

What does the Emergency Order mean for the concessionaire?

For the concessionaire, the ICC’s September 16 Order makes it harder to achieve the immediate objective of restoring or suspending the effects of the termination of the concession contract through an urgent measure.

This is particularly important because interim measures have precisely the function of protecting a party’s position while the arbitration examines the case on the merits.

With the requested measure refused, the concessionaire must continue the main battle through arguments and evidence on the contract itself and its termination.

And one final detail: the Emergency Order charges the concessionaire with the costs of the arbitration. In our courts, but also in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, court costs are usually left to the losing party of a trial.

Procedurally, this allows the case to continue without the measure requested by the concessionaire.

The decision constitutes an important victory for the Ministry of Infrastructure and Energy. The Emergency Arbitrator fully rejected two of VIA’s three requests and did not accept VIA’s main request to suspend the termination of the Concession Contract. The only measure ordered was the limited and temporary preservation of the status quo, until the arbitral tribunal is constituted and able to examine the case.

Most importantly, the Arbitrator rejected VIA’s main request to suspend both the termination of the Concession Contract and the implementation of the Termination Notice, under the broadly extra-contractual conditions requested by VIA. The Emergency Arbitrator agreed with MIE that neither the Contract nor the evidence presented offered sufficient legal basis to do this.

As a consequence, the termination of the Concession Contract has entered into force.

The Arbitrator also rejected VIA’s requests to compel MIE to take part in mediation and appoint a mediator, as well as to postpone the start of the arbitration for two more months. The rejection of these requests confirms that the dispute, in which MIE will continue to firmly defend its position, can now move immediately to the arbitral tribunal.

The only relief granted was a short-term interim measure. The Emergency Arbitrator ordered MIE to temporarily refrain from exercising certain rights arising after the termination of the Concession Contract. The Arbitrator emphasized that the measure is short-term and will remain in force only until the arbitral tribunal is constituted and able to examine the case. The short-term measure does not affect the validity or effectiveness of the termination of the Concession Contract.

In light of these findings, the Emergency Arbitrator also ordered VIA to bear the costs of the emergency arbitration proceedings.

The decision therefore represents a clear failure by VIA to secure the decision that was the essence of its request. VIA sought to prevent the termination of the Concession Contract from entering into force and to delay the start of the arbitration through a prolonged mediation process. It achieved neither. The termination of the Contract was not suspended, the requests regarding mediation and the extension of the deadline were rejected, and the only accepted request is a short-term measure preserving the status quo until the arbitral tribunal is constituted and can examine the case itself.

The decision enables MIE to prepare the further steps arising from the termination of the Concession Contract, which are necessary to protect the public interest, while fully respecting the limited and short-term measure ordered pending the constitution of the arbitral tribunal and its decision on this case.

Another serious problem that forced the Albanian Government to initiate proceedings for the termination of the Vlora International Airport concession contract related to a €100 million loan, taken by one of the concessionaire’s companies without the prior approval of the Albanian State.

In March 2025, the company “Mabco” signed a loan agreement with the financial firm “Delphos Securities,” worth €100 million. According to publicly disclosed information, the funds would be used for two main purposes: completing the construction of the Vlora Airport and repaying an existing bank loan of “Mabco.”

At first glance, such financing could be considered a positive development for the project. Large infrastructure projects require considerable capital and a new loan could provide the liquidity needed to complete the works.

However, the main concern was not related to the amount of the loan, but to the guarantees given in favor of the lender and the consequences they could have on the revenues, administration and financial future of a strategic infrastructure such as the Vlora International Airport. These elements were considered by the Albanian authorities as another serious violation of the concession relationship and one of the reasons that led to the initiation of proceedings for the termination of the contract.

€100 million: financing for construction or a burden on the future?

The problem was not only the amount of the financing, but above all the guarantees offered and the rights the lender gained over the economic and financial future of the Vlora Airport.

Under the loan agreement, “Delphos Securities” received guarantees over all future revenues of the airport, including those guaranteed by the Albanian state.

Vlora Airport and the State Budget

The State Budget guarantees minimum revenues in the first 10 years (if they turn out to be less than €140 million). Specifically:

• – Year IV: €9.6 million
• – Year V: €10.3 million
• – Year VI: €11.2 million
• – Year VII: €12.1 million

Source: AL-STUDIM-FIZIBILITETI-VIA.pdf

But this was not the only guarantee. The agreement gave “Delphos Securities” control over the company’s bank accounts and financial policies, as well as the right to transfer these rights to third parties.

These provisions conflict with the BOT concession contract of the Vlora Airport, which expressly prohibits granting such guarantees without the prior approval of the Albanian State. Such approval was neither sought nor granted.

Precisely for this reason, the State Advocacy considered the agreement an act of high legal risk. In other words, a private financial institution could gain economic control over a strategic state project, without the knowledge and approval of the Albanian State.

Under these conditions, a private company took on financial commitments that potentially affect the revenues, administration and operation of a strategic national infrastructure, outside the approval and control mechanisms foreseen in the concession contract.

The guarantees given by “Mabco” raise serious questions about the concessionaire’s real rights, contractual obligations toward the Albanian State, the interests of creditors, intervention mechanisms in case of non-payment, as well as the financial consequences they could have on the operation of the airport.

An airport’s revenues are not simply the revenues of a private company. They derive from the operation of a strategic national asset, built and administered on the basis of a concession relationship with the Albanian State.

What would happen if the loan were not repaid?

If “Mabco” were unable to repay the loan, what rights would the lender exercise?

Since the loan guarantees extended over the project’s future revenues, the creditor could seek control over these revenues, over the bank accounts where they were deposited and over the way the airport’s financial flows were administered.

Moreover, the contract recognized the lender’s right to transfer these rights to a third party. This means that, in the event of a financial crisis or non-payment of the loan, economic control over the airport’s revenues could pass to other entities, unknown at the time the agreement was signed.

Control over bank accounts and the transfer of rights to third parties

Another problematic aspect relates to control over the company’s bank accounts and financial policies.

When a lender gains broad powers over a concessionaire’s financial flows, it no longer remains a passive creditor. In practice, it gains significant influence over how the company’s funds are administered.

In an ordinary private project this could be considered a normal part of the financing relationship. But when it comes to a strategic concession, a fundamental question arises: where does the private creditor’s legitimate right end and where does the protection of the public interest begin?

Equally concerning is the fact that the agreement allowed the transfer of the lender’s rights to third parties.

This creates a serious transparency problem, because the financing structure could change at any moment, not necessarily remaining the same as when the agreement was signed.

For an airport of strategic importance such as the Vlora Airport, natural questions arise:

Who is the real beneficiary of these rights?

Who could become the creditor in the future?

What rights are transferred concretely?

What are the legal limitations?

What protective mechanisms does the Albanian State have in the event of such a transfer?

In this case, transparency is not a luxury; it is a necessity.

The risk is not only financial, but also operational

An airport must operate without interruption once put into operation. This requires continuous maintenance, qualified personnel, technical systems, security standards, service contracts and sustainable financial resources.

If the airport’s revenues are burdened with considerable financial obligations toward creditors, it must be guaranteed that, even after these obligations are paid, sufficient funds remain for the normal operation of the airport.

An airport cannot be administered with the logic of a business that aims only at debt repayment. It is a critical infrastructure, which must at all times have sufficient financial resources to guarantee security, continuity of operation and the quality of public service.

Ultimately, the issue was not simply about taking a €100 million loan. Large infrastructure projects are often financed through loans. The problem lay in how this financing was secured, the guarantees given in favor of the lender and the lack of prior approval of the Albanian State, contrary to the obligations foreseen in the concession contract.

When the guarantees of a loan extend over the revenues of a strategic asset, including revenues guaranteed by the State Budget, when the creditor gains rights over the concessionaire’s bank accounts and financial policies, as well as the possibility to transfer these rights to third parties, then the issue no longer remains an ordinary financial relationship between a company and its creditor. It directly affects the public interest, the legal security of the concession contract and the protection of an infrastructure of strategic importance for the country.

Precisely for this reason, this loan agreement was considered by the Albanian authorities as a serious violation of the concession relationship and became one of the elements supporting the Albanian Government’s decision to initiate proceedings for the termination of the concession contract of the Vlora International Airport.