The urgent need for deep reform of the intelligence institutions

SPAK’s request a few days ago for the arrest — while she was in office — of former State Intelligence Service (SHISH) director Vlora Hyseni is a grave event that should make us all reflect.

Intelligence institutions, first and foremost SHISH, are among the most important structures of national security. For this reason, any serious doubt about weaknesses in information control, conflicts of interest, foreign interference, mismanagement of classified information, or malfunctioning of oversight mechanisms should serve as a push for deep institutional reform.

Reform — not on individual cases, and without political character

This reform must not be built on individual cases, no matter how grave and shocking the Vlora Hyseni case is. The Special Prosecution will see it through to the end — the very creation of which was made possible by this governing majority we have today.

Likewise, the reform must not have a political character either. It should aim at strengthening institutions, professionalizing staff, protecting classified information, and guaranteeing democratic oversight of the institution. But why is reform necessary? Because today’s security environment is far more complex than before. Beyond traditional threats, Albanian institutions face organized crime, cyberattacks, disinformation, foreign interference, and terrorism.

This requires intelligence services to have, first, modern technological and human capacities, just as SPAK does today. And at the same time, much stronger mechanisms of control and accountability.

Second, professionalization must rise above political ties. Intelligence services must function on the basis of merit, professional integrity, security vetting, and clear career standards. Appointments at senior levels must be backed by professional criteria and verifiable procedures. The more important the duty, the more rigorous the vetting process must be.

Cybersecurity — an absolute priority

Third, control over classified information must be significantly strengthened. Information and trust are the primary capital of an intelligence service. For this reason, procedures must be reinforced defining who can have access to information, what level of information each official can see, how access is recorded, how documents are stored, how electronic systems are monitored, and how a security incident is reported. The principle must be clear: no one should have greater access than their function requires.

Fourth, cybersecurity must be a priority. In the digital era, information protection cannot rely solely on physical documents and traditional registration procedures. Intelligence institutions must have advanced systems for cyber protection, continuous auditing, access logging, anomaly detection, and periodic testing of systems. For this, contracting outside companies or experts in sensitive fields must be done on the basis of strict security criteria, certifications, and relevant authorizations.

Strong democratic oversight of intelligence institutions

Fifth, these institutions, first and foremost SHISH, need stronger democratic oversight. Intelligence institutions indeed need confidentiality, but confidentiality must not imply lack of oversight.

Parliament must have effective mechanisms for their supervision, naturally respecting the limits set by classified information. Parliamentary oversight must be professional and institutional, not partisan. There must be the possibility to check whether the law has been respected, whether the budget has been administered properly, whether security procedures have been implemented, and whether competences have been exceeded.

Sixth, internal control must be real. A security institution cannot be controlled only from the outside. It must have powerful internal control mechanisms. Structures must exist capable of identifying in time conflicts of interest, unjustified access, protocol violations, information leaks, foreign interference, and conduct that could harm institutional integrity. These structures must have sufficient independence even from the head of the institution, to report even when the information touches the highest levels of the hierarchy.

Seventh, and among the most important, relations with international partners must take major priority. Albania is a NATO member and cooperates closely with the United States and EU countries in the field of security and intelligence. This cooperation requires high standards for protecting classified information, and the reform should aim at further harmonizing Albanian procedures with NATO standards and with the practices of American and European partners, guaranteeing that shared information is preserved and used only by authorized persons.

Integrity checks — not only at the moment of appointment

Eighth, one of the greatest risks for any intelligence institution is the infiltration or influence of organized crime. For this reason, integrity checks must be continuous and not only a procedure performed at the moment of appointment. Potential conflicts of interest, assets, and relationships that could create security risks must be verified. This does not mean limiting employees’ private lives, but protecting the institution from vulnerabilities that could be exploited by criminal or foreign actors.

Reforming intelligence institutions should not be seen as a reaction to one person’s scandal or a single event. It should be seen as a long-term investment in Albania’s national security.