European Union enlargement in a time of war and uncertainty

By Odeta Barbullushi

The political and technical aspects of the new enlargement policy

Every October, candidate countries await with a student’s anxiety the European Commission’s annual report on their fulfilment of the conditions linked to the reforms of the negotiation package. Unlike previous years, this October will bring several novelties regarding enlargement policy, and what has commonly been described as the gradual integration of the region’s countries into the European Union. Alongside the annual reports on reform progress, the European Commission is also expected to present a work plan for the frontrunner countries of the integration process, as well as a new strategy on the gradual or phased integration of candidates into the EU.

The European Commission’s October proposals are expected to include clear roadmaps with time markers and concrete tasks for Montenegro and Albania, as well as for Moldova and Ukraine. The roadmaps will include the steps that not only the candidate countries but also the member states will have to take by the end of 2027, with the aim of completing the technical negotiation process. These roadmaps, together with the Commission’s proposals on gradual integration, will be presented to the leaders of the member states at the mid-October Summit.

But beyond the sequence of these institutional steps, the background of these changes must be understood and, more importantly, the challenges that have led to this moment of reformatting enlargement policy. These challenges can be summarised in three: first, addressing Ukraine’s membership aspirations and security guarantees on the one hand, and the Western Balkan countries’ demand for greater inclusion in the Union’s economic instruments, with the aim of improving economic and social convergence, on the other; second, guaranteeing the progress and irreversibility of the reform process, mainly in the block of the Fundamentals chapters, which are directly linked to the sustainability of rule-of-law state institutions, democracy and justice in the member countries; third, strengthening the credibility of the European integration process, and more broadly of the European Union, despite the possibility of member states blocking the process along the way or at its end. This last point is inseparably linked to the need for the European Union’s own internal reform, in the interest of the proper functioning of decision-making, increased competitiveness and the strengthening of strategic autonomy vis-à-vis other actors. This at a time when, because of the war in Ukraine and transatlantic tensions, the EU needs more than ever since the end of the Cold War to demonstrate unity, credibility and strategic clarity.

In this context, enlargement policy at this moment serves the European Union both as an instrument of influence over the external security environment, and as an instrument for recreating its new identity. The changes to this policy expected to be proposed in the coming days must be seen in the prism of these developments and of the Union’s repositioning.

Gradual integration and new rules: a new methodology based on an old idea?

One of the aspects of enlargement that the Commission’s new proposals will seek to address is the large gap between being a member state, with full rights, and being a country very close to membership and advanced on the integration path, but not yet a member. To respond to this challenge, at the European Council in Granada, Spain, in October 2023, the member states committed to a preparation of both sides — the candidate countries as well as the member states — for the Union’s enlargement, and integrated the concept of gradual integration into the political framework of enlargement.

In May of this year, five countries, known as the friends of enlargement — Austria, Italy, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia — circulated a confidential document, in which they proposed a process of gradual integration, based on individual merit, of the candidate countries into the Single Market. A few weeks later, in a move more political than technical, French President Macron and German Chancellor Scholz jointly drafted a proposal for the gradual integration of candidate countries, the possibility of an associate member status for Ukraine, and the possibility of candidate countries in the enlargement process joining the Single Market before full membership in the European Union. The Franco-German proposal thus went beyond integration into the Single Market, as it aimed to also address the issue of the gradual political integration of candidate countries and the offering of a form of security guarantee for Ukraine.

The idea of gradual integration has accompanied enlargement policy for a long time, but it began to occupy a central place in the enlargement debates as a result of three main developments in the last decade: first, the stagnation of the accession process for candidate countries after Croatia’s membership in 2013 until the start of the war in Ukraine in 2022; second, the pandemic crisis in 2020; and finally, the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The stagnation of the last decade brought the paradox that the technical advancement of candidate countries towards membership did not correspond with their fulfilment of the basic democratic criteria, leading in fact to a regression, or ‘backsliding’, in democratic standards.

Meanwhile, both the pandemic and the war in Ukraine highlighted the need to include partner countries in European efforts against common security challenges, a need identified in the 2022 Strategic Compass for Security and Defence. Driven by the circumstances of this geopolitical context, the European Union initiated several initiatives aimed at strengthening cooperation with the Western Balkans and the gradual integration of the region’s countries in several strategic areas.

The most important of these is an instrument such as the Growth and Reform Plan for the Western Balkans in 2023, conceived with the aim of fulfilling three missions at once: to push the countries to carry out reforms in exchange for financial incentives or sanctions, to enable the gradual integration of the region’s countries in areas such as energy and decarbonisation, the free movement of goods, services and labour, the creation of a common digital market, the facilitation of transport and integration into the European electronic payments area; and finally, to enable the region’s countries to attract a larger volume of European Union financing, as their preparation for accessing the cohesion funds that would follow full integration as member states.

In economic terms, this process of gradual integration has already begun with several initiatives, such as the membership of the region’s countries in SEPA (the Single Euro Payments Area), the inclusion of the region’s countries in the Green Corridors of trade and transport between the EU and the Western Balkans, and up to the expected agreement in the coming months on reducing telecommunications roaming tariffs between the Union and the region’s countries.

But despite the merit of the Growth Plan as a preparatory, monitoring and also conditioning instrument of the EU for the candidate countries, it cannot replace full membership, either in terms of the political transformation or the economic convergence that the accession process is expected to bring. The same can be said of the gradual integration approach as a whole; it does not promise membership in the Single Market, let alone full membership in the EU.

For this reason, in parallel with the start of work on drafting the European Union Accession Treaty with Montenegro, the member states and the Commission have worked for months on a series of proposals for offering economic incentives to the countries closest to fulfilling the reforms. In this framework, the most important initiative is expected to be the one regarding the possibility of candidate countries joining the Single Market at the moment of fulfilling all the duties and conditions linked to membership — that is, in the period between the completion of the technical negotiation process and the ratification of the agreement by the member states. While for Croatia this intermediate period lasted about a year and a half, and for the countries of Eastern and Central Europe only a year, the blocking of the ratification of the Accession Treaty of the new countries by the member states could last much longer.

This option would offer a membership similar to that of Liechtenstein, Iceland and Norway in the European Economic Area (EEA), together with the 27 EU member states. This means a Single Market membership agreement, but unlike EU member states, exemption from joining the Common Agricultural and Fisheries Policy, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Union’s Taxation Policies, the Customs Union, Justice and Home Affairs (including police cooperation). Likewise, non-EU countries currently adhering to the EEA do not have access to the structural cohesion funds, an instrument identified as an accelerator of social and economic convergence between the region and the EU.

Despite these, this approach would strengthen the predictability and credibility of the process, in conditions where there is a risk of the membership of new countries from the region being blocked by member states, such as France. Such a possibility is real and possible, since in member states like France, support for the membership of Western Balkan countries is no higher than 36% and 40% for Albania and Montenegro respectively, according to the Eurobarometer survey on Enlargement of September 2025.

However, it must be borne in mind that even to reach the final moment of completing the technical negotiation process and integration into the Single Market, candidate countries must go through the same process as they would have to for full membership, including all the reforms linked to strengthening the rule of law, justice and democratic institutions. To avoid the blocking of the technical enlargement negotiation process by member states, at moments such as the opening of a given cluster or specific chapters, the Commission is expected to also propose the reform of internal voting and the move from unanimity voting to qualified majority voting for the transitional steps of the process, a practice known as the application of ‘passerelle’ or ‘bridging’ clauses without leading to a change of the EU Treaties on decision-making in certain areas. The application of passerelle clauses in the field of enlargement would make it possible for member states to vote unanimously only for the decisive moments, such as regarding the opening or closing of the negotiation process. For the intermediate steps, qualified majority voting would suffice. This constitutes a fundamental change of enlargement policy and frees decision-making in the Council from the deadlock of blocking by internal political actors in member states, or from the ‘bilateralisation of the process’ created for reasons linked to the bilateral relations of member states with the candidates waiting at the door.

The other change of enlargement policy is expected to be linked to additional guarantees to avoid the democratic backsliding of countries from the reforms carried out at the moment of membership in the EU. The experience of the growth of authoritarian tendencies in some new member states, as well as the limited results of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism used in the case of Romania and Bulgaria to ensure the sustainability of reforms after accession, have led to the need to draft a series of ‘safeguards’ for the new countries. This means that the new Accession Treaty of Montenegro, which will serve as a kind of roadmap for Albania and the other candidate countries, will embody a series of monitoring and ‘punishment’ mechanisms for the new members, in case of the use of the veto, or of taking steps back in rule-of-law reforms.

Finally, gradual integration will not stop at integration into the Single Market, but also into community mechanisms and institutions before the full membership of candidate countries in the EU. An example of this gradual institutional integration is the inclusion of representatives of the civil society of candidate countries in the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC). The ambition of the new proposals is expected to extend to the participation of representatives of the governments of candidate countries in the meetings of the leaders or Ministers of the EU member states on areas of strategic and common importance. The political aspect is just as important, as it helps in what is called ‘institutional socialisation’, that is, mutual acquaintance through interaction and the learning of the norms of behaviour of countries within the EU institutions.

The limitations of gradual or phased membership

Despite the merits of the proposals for gradual integration, it must be said that gradual economic integration is not a very new idea, organically integrated in fact in the accession process of new countries. In truth, gradual membership in the European market by enabling the free movement of goods, labour and services is foreseen in the bilateral Stabilisation and Association Agreements between the EU and the region’s countries. Therefore it is necessary that the Commission’s new proposals include concrete steps and the dates by which the four above-mentioned countries are expected to be ready for the signing of the Accession Treaty, as well as the steps to the finish line of the technical accession process. Moreover, the Union itself must commit to taking the proper steps towards reforming decision-making within 2027.

The new approach regarding enlargement policy will bring a qualitative leap in the relationship of candidates such as Montenegro and Albania, as well as the Eastern Partnership countries, with the European Union. But in practice, they may also create two different categories of members within the Union — countries with full rights and those with fewer political rights, but gradually integrated into all the mechanisms and institutions of the Union, including the Single Market. Moreover, with the membership of Montenegro and Albania, the EU needs to think of a re-engagement plan in the rest of the region too, both on the economic and on the security plane.

Finally, an intensive dialogue with the public administration, as well as with civil society, universities and the media, will give the new strategy more trust and a sense of ownership of the actors, mainly of the candidate countries. The solutions offered may be of a technical nature, but the problems they seek to solve are thoroughly political, and as such must include the citizens and the leadership of the candidate countries.

This article is published within a series of articles on the theme “Media and European Integration” of the Albanian Media Institute.