The 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi

The 18th summit in New Delhi represented more than an annual diplomatic gathering. It reflected the growing demand of new economic powers for a bigger role in setting the rules of the international system. On the other hand, this summit laid bare the contradictions of a grouping that includes strategic rivals, energy exporters and importers, democracies and authoritarian regimes — and at the same time the complexity of relations between countries that find themselves on different sides of today’s international conflicts.

WHAT DOES BRICS REPRESENT?

According to official Indian sources, BRICS counts 11 member states: the five founders — Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa; the four countries that joined in 2024 — Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates; Indonesia, admitted in 2025; and Saudi Arabia, although the latter’s formal status remains unclear in international reporting. Alongside full members, a circle of ten partner countries has been created — Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Vietnam — giving the grouping an even broader reach across Eurasia, Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia. This expansion has turned BRICS into a grouping representing around 48.5% of the world’s population, compared with less than 10% for the G7. In purchasing-power terms, BRICS countries produce about 40.7% of global GDP, compared with 28.4% for the G7; yet in nominal value the G7 continues to lead, with roughly $54.5 trillion against BRICS’ nearly $32 trillion. The gap has also narrowed in merchandise trade: BRICS secures approximately a quarter of world exports, while the G7 retains a small lead. In technology, the picture is more complex: the G7, above all the United States, continues to dominate private investment and the most advanced artificial-intelligence models, but China, the technological engine of BRICS, leads the world in patent applications and scientific publications on artificial intelligence, aiming to close the qualitative gap.

WHAT WAS THIS SUMMIT?

India’s task at the BRICS summit on September 12–13 was not simply to welcome the leaders of an already enlarged grouping. New Delhi aimed to show that BRICS is still able to reach common positions and produce concrete forms of cooperation, precisely at a time when enlargement risks diluting its original purpose. The summit’s official theme was “Building resilience through innovation, cooperation and sustainable development” and was deliberately oriented toward development rather than ideological clashes. The unanimous adoption of the New Delhi Declaration on the very first day was a significant diplomatic success for India. Consensus was by no means guaranteed. The escalation of the conflict in the Middle East had created strong clashes between Iran and the United Arab Emirates, while the war in Ukraine, relations with the United States and differing national interests continue to create different blocs within BRICS.

Yet the declaration itself reveals BRICS’ essential nature: a space where, on the one hand, dissatisfaction with the existing international order is articulated, and on the other it remains far more cautious when it comes to defining a shared alternative. Its strength stems from the political, economic and demographic weight of its member countries, while its weakness comes from the difficulty of turning that weight into coordinated action.

REFORM, NOT ABANDONMENT

The clearest point of the New Delhi Summit was the reform of global governance. BRICS leaders called for a more representative international system and a broad reform of the United Nations, including the Security Council. China and Russia reiterated their support for India’s and Brazil’s aspirations for a bigger role in the UN, while the declaration also recognized Africa’s long-standing demands for stronger representation.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi described the existing order as a pyramid, at the top of which decision-making continues to be concentrated, while the states most affected by those decisions have limited ability to influence them. According to him, reform of the Security Council should be accompanied by broader changes and reform at the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

This agenda should not be interpreted simply as a rejection of multilateralism. BRICS wants more multilateralism — but a multilateralism less defined by the institutions and power relations created after World War II. The New Delhi Declaration calls for more voting power and representation for developing economies at the IMF and the World Bank. At the same time, it defends the World Trade Organization and calls for the full restoration of its dispute-settlement mechanism.

It can be said that BRICS (at least openly) does not propose to abandon the existing international system, but to rebalance it. India, in particular, has opposed efforts to define the grouping as a genuine anti-Western alliance. New Delhi maintains close relations with the US and Europe, preserves its old partnership with Russia and tries to stabilize its difficult relationship with China. BRICS offers India a space for strategic autonomy and cooperation with multiple centers of power, without definitively aligning with any of them.

THE SUMMIT: ECONOMICS BEFORE IDEOLOGY

India also tried to steer the summit toward concrete economic issues. The declaration envisages stronger cooperation in trade, development financing, food and energy security, artificial intelligence and digital public infrastructure. It calls for more resilient supply chains and criticizes unilateral tariffs, sanctions and other coercive economic measures that member countries consider incompatible with international law. Despite continued desires and speculation, BRICS did not announce the creation of a common currency. Indian officials clarified that such a proposal is not currently under consideration. The more realistic objective is to promote trade and investment in national currencies, as well as the gradual improvement of interoperability between cross-border payment systems.

India has also proposed the possible linking of central-bank digital currencies for cross-border payments. In theory, such a mechanism could lower transaction costs and dependence on existing financial channels. In practice, political, regulatory and technical obstacles remain large, while the use of official digital currencies is still limited. This distinction is not merely technical. BRICS is not on the verge of replacing the dollar with a new currency. Its effort is more gradual and less spectacular: it aims to build additional payment channels through which member countries can trade in their own currencies. For Russia and Iran, this would offer protection from Western sanctions. For India and other members, it would bring diversification, without requiring a complete break from the dollar-backed financial system.

The New Development Bank remains the grouping’s most concrete institutional achievement. According to its data, it has approved around $42.9 billion in financing for 139 projects. The New Delhi Declaration calls on the bank to expand financing in local currencies and to strengthen its role in sustainable infrastructure and long-term development.

Yet the gap between BRICS’ ambitions and its institutional capacity remains considerable. The New Development Bank matters, but its size is still modest compared with the World Bank and with the financial needs of developing countries. The real test will not be the number of commitments listed in the declaration, but the willingness of member states to provide the resources that turn them into real projects.

CONSENSUS IN THE SHADOW OF WAR

The joint declaration expressed “deep concern” over the escalation of the conflict in the Middle East and Iran, and called for “maximum restraint”, emphasizing dialogue, consultations and diplomacy. It can be said that the declaration did not directly assign responsibility to any state. This measured wording made unanimity possible to a large extent, but at the same time showed the limits of BRICS diplomacy. The consensus was not based on a shared interpretation of the conflict, but on language broad enough to allow member countries to preserve their positions.

That does not mean the agreement was weightless. At a time when diplomatic forums often merely reproduce geopolitical divisions, placing Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Russia, China, India and other states behind the same declaration has political significance. Yet agreement on a few general principles should not be confused with a common foreign policy or the creation of a BRICS peace mechanism. The same caution applies to Ukraine. India continues to insist on dialogue and diplomacy, while Modi again raised the need to end the conflict during talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin. But BRICS remains unable to develop a detailed collective position, because its members differ profoundly in their relations with Moscow and the West.

INDIA BETWEEN CHINA AND RUSSIA

Some of the summit’s most important diplomacy took place outside the official sessions. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit was his first to India in seven years. The visit created an opportunity to stabilize relations between Asia’s two biggest powers. In the bilateral meeting, Modi and Xi agreed that differences must not turn into uncontrolled disagreements and expressed support for a fair settlement acceptable to both sides on the border issue. They also discussed structural imbalances in trade, uncertainties in supply chains and the need for more predictable market access. These statements do not yet constitute a strategic reset of relations. Unresolved border disagreements remain, mutual distrust continues, and India views China’s economic and political lead within BRICS with concern. Yet the meeting shows why the grouping matters even when its declarations produce no immediate change. Such summits serve as diplomatic spaces where rival states can manage relations without claiming that differences have disappeared.

India’s relations with Russia reflect the same careful balance. Modi and Putin discussed energy, trade and Ukraine, while India re-emphasized the importance of dialogue and the security of maritime trade. New Delhi seeks to preserve its historic ties with Moscow, but without allowing those relations to limit its alternatives elsewhere. BRICS serves precisely this purpose and enables India to cooperate with Russia and China while continuing partnerships with Western countries.

A BIGGER COALITION

BRICS’ expansion has increased its geographical reach and international visibility, while at the same time making the grouping even harder to steer. Member countries agree that the Global South deserves a stronger voice, but not necessarily on the shape the new order should take. Some see BRICS primarily as an instrument for limiting Western influence, others as a negotiating platform for reforming existing institutions. India belongs chiefly to the second approach. Its emphasis on technology, development financing, food security, energy sustainability and institutional reform aims to give BRICS a practical identity not based solely on opposition to the West. This approach makes the grouping more attractive even to states seeking greater autonomy but unwilling to be forced to choose between rival geopolitical camps.

This may also be where BRICS’ most important role lies. It does not need to become a unified alliance to influence international politics. By coordinating demands for UN reform, greater representation in financial institutions and more policy space for developing countries, the grouping can change the very terms of the global debate. Its existence reflects a world in which power is being distributed across more centers and in which Western states can no longer expect their priorities to automatically define the international agenda. Yet influence should not necessarily be confused with cohesion. The New Delhi Declaration showed that BRICS can still speak with one voice, but only if that voice is broad enough to include often opposing interests. India’s diplomatic success was preserving consensus without forcing member states to accept positions that were untenable for them. The price of that success was a document stronger on shared aspirations than on binding commitments. Therefore, the significance of the New Delhi summit will not be measured by the length of the declaration, nor by predictions of the immediate arrival of a post-Western order, but by far more concrete questions: Will BRICS finance more development projects? Will it ease cross-border payments? Will it reduce trade barriers among members? Will there be cooperation in technology? Will it build effective coalitions for reforming international institutions? BRICS is today a reality too big to ignore. But on the other hand it remains too divided to act as a single geopolitical pole. New Delhi displayed both these realities at once. The grouping has gained a more powerful voice on world affairs, but the question remains whether, beyond summit declarations, it will manage to turn that voice into joint action?!