What is hidden on page 4 of the AfD motion

By Ardit Rada

On 18 September, Russia’s Consulate General in Bonn closed its doors. The German government had announced the closure on 1 September, the day it concluded that Russia stood behind the attempted drone attack on Leipzig airport in early August. Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt said that the police findings, the way the attack was carried out and intelligence information, taken together, proved Russian responsibility.

Four days after the closure, on 22 September, the AfD parliamentary group in the Bundestag tabled a motion asking the government to reverse this decision. The document bears the number Drucksache 21/8124 and has been circulated as a preliminary version. It carries the names of fifty AfD MPs and, on behalf of the parliamentary group, the signatures of Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla. Its title speaks of Ukraine: no EU membership and no guarantees of military aid. The Russian consulate appears only in a footnote at the bottom of page 4.

Six of the ten demands relate directly to what the title says. Points 1 and 2 oppose the application to Ukraine of Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union, as well as any form of “associate membership.” Points 6 through 8 oppose security commitments undertaken through declarations, the creation of new special membership statuses for third states, and a status for Ukraine that expands step by step. Point 9 demands the publication of the Chancellor’s letter to Brussels. The other four points relate to aid, Ukraine’s frozen assets, reconstruction, Nord Stream and sanctions against Russia.

The letter

In May, Reuters reported that Chancellor Friedrich Merz had proposed for Ukraine the status of an “associate member,” a category that does not exist in EU rules, as well as the extension to Ukraine of the security guarantees provided by Article 42(7), excluding from them the current war.

The AfD’s legal observation is accurate. Article 42(7) obliges member states to give aid to a member state that becomes the object of an armed attack, whereas Ukraine is a candidate country and not a member state. The motion further argues that a commitment of this weight must be grounded in a treaty and a Bundestag vote. German constitutional law is not so categorical. Treaties are regulated by Article 59 of the Basic Law and troop deployments require parliamentary approval, but the Constitutional Court has long considered acts of foreign policy that do not take the form of treaties to be a competence of the government.

The AfD here is raising a political argument — and a serious one. The promise of mutual defence to a country at war is a decision a government may choose to put to parliament even when nothing legally obliges it to do so. Even the demand for the full publication of the letter is a demand that could be backed by any opposition parliamentary group.

The rule on page 4

The motion formulates in its own words a principle. In the case of Nord Stream, it notes, the government did not propose measures against Ukraine “mit Rücksicht auf laufende Gerichtsverfahren” — out of consideration for ongoing court proceedings. According to the motion, the same standard should be applied to Leipzig: no rushed conclusions, but transparency first.

Both cases are before the courts. In the case of Leipzig, the government’s attribution of responsibility is political, while the criminal investigation continues. For Nord Stream, federal prosecutors in July charged a former Ukrainian army officer with joint commission of a war crime, claiming he had acted on behalf of Ukrainian state entities. He denies involvement, while the Ukrainian government has always denied ordering the attack.

But the principle applies only to Leipzig. When it comes to Nord Stream, the motion describes the damage as “mutmaßlich,” supposedly caused by Ukraine, and on that assumption demands that Ukraine pay all the costs that followed. If Ukraine does not pay within ten years, its state assets should be placed as collateral. The figure the motion uses for the cost is €295 billion in higher liquefied natural gas (LNG) bills for the EU economy. Footnote 15 takes this figure from ng.ru, the website of the Moscow daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta.

The consulate is just one point on a longer list. Footnote 10, citing the weekly Junge Freiheit, mentions visa restrictions and entry checks for Russian citizens, measures against the so-called “shadow fleet” — which the motion says risk escalation in the Baltic — the summoning of the Russian ambassador, and new additions to the EU sanctions lists. The cessation of the Russian House’s activity in Berlin is treated in the main text, where the motion notes that Moscow responded by banning the Goethe Institute and describes the result as the loss of the “last cultural bridges” between the two countries. Point 10 asks the government to refrain from further sanctions that “are not in Germany’s interest.”

After the condemnation of the war

The explanatory part opens by condemning Russia’s war as a violation of international law. But then it adds that the war came after years of provocations and the “gradual,” de facto, integration of Ukraine into NATO structures; that there was a diplomatic solution and that Russia, “unfortunately,” did not pursue it to the end. The West — meaning the Biden administration together with Germany, France and Britain — is attributed a share of the responsibility for prolonging the war.

Point 4 provides for the gradual reduction of German financial and military support, including that given through the European Peace Facility, until Ukraine is ready for “serious” peace negotiations. Humanitarian aid is excluded from this restriction. No condition is placed on Russia to fulfil. In return for loans already given, Germany should secure privileged access to Ukraine’s rare minerals, metals and gas.

Point 5 deals with reconstruction. Areas occupied by Russia should be rebuilt with frozen Russian state assets, which would be released after a peace agreement. Areas under Ukraine’s control should be rebuilt with revenue from the sale of Ukrainian raw materials. The use of German funds is excluded. Under this scheme, Russia’s money would be spent on territory controlled by Russia, while Ukraine would pay for the rest by selling the underground riches of the territory it has kept under control, with Germany holding a preferential claim on these resources.

A threshold with history

Instead of membership, the motion proposes a “privileged partnership.” Ukrainian goods would gain full access to the common market as soon as Ukraine fully met EU standards. Services and the right of establishment would be included only when Ukraine’s GDP per capita, measured in purchasing power parity, reached 68 percent of the EU average — the level of Greece and Bulgaria. According to the motion, Ukraine is currently at 29 percent.

Bulgaria and Romania joined the European Union in 2007 when, by the same indicator, they stood well below half the EU average. Whether the same rule should have applied to them, the motion does not say.

The clause for others

Point 7 is the part that touches this region. It opposes any new form of special, security-based membership for third states that goes beyond the treaties and “could serve as a precedent for other candidate countries for membership or for the neighbouring states of the European Union.”

The formulation goes beyond Ukraine. Moldova is already mentioned in the text, in the scenario where a Ukrainian intervention in Transnistria and a Russian response could activate Article 42(7). The Russian troops stationed in Transnistria, whose presence makes this very scenario possible, are not mentioned.

The government’s position, which the motion opposes, is documented. Merz’s letter said the proposal for Ukraine would not affect other candidate countries and asked the EU to consider innovative solutions for those countries that have waited longest. At the EU–Western Balkans summit in Tivat on 5 June, Merz and Macron presented a proposal for gradual integration, while the Chancellor told the region’s leaders that the EU wants their countries to become members soon. Albania, together with Montenegro, is among the candidate countries closest to this objective.

The ordinary accession process is not included in the scope of point 7. Intermediate forms that contain a security element are. And the other candidates are mentioned precisely as the reason to exclude these forms. This is the largest opposition group in the Bundestag putting on paper its position on the region, in a document whose title mentions only Ukraine.

What remains written in the document

It is unlikely that the governing majority will approve the motion. Nevertheless, the document leaves something of importance in writing: a principle of restraint while court proceedings are still ongoing, formulated by the AfD itself, and the two different ways in which this principle is applied.

When it comes to Russia, this principle leads to the demand to reopen a consulate and stop sanctions.

When it comes to Ukraine, it ends in a bill of €295 billion — calculated by a Moscow newspaper.